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Introduction
Present proposals for law reform in NZ would shift
the balance towards greater ministerial decision-making
in environmental management and are serving to high-
light a tension in the law between competing manifes-
tations of democracy. Principles developed in environmental
law tend to promote public participation in decision-
making through forms of “participatory” or “delibera-
tive democracy”, whereas underlying common law doctrine
can reinforce conceptions of “representative democ-
racy” by isolating ministerial decision-making from
public participation. This article explains and explores
how divergent legal principles and doctrine can impact
public participation and pull in different directions by
considering the changes proposed by the Resource
Legislation Amendment Bill 2016 (NZ). Fundamentally,
this article concludes that this tension in the law is
problematic and should be explicitly acknowledged and
addressed within the present debate and any future
debates concerning environmental decision-making.
Proposed reforms
The Resource Legislation Amendment Bill proposes
significant changes to a number of NZ’s environmental
statutes, including the Resource Management Act 1991
(NZ) (RMA), the primary planning and environmental
Act that governs all land, air and water. Three particular
themes are apparent in the Bill:
• the first concerns increased ministerial decision-
making;
• the second reduces public participation in both
plan-making and individual permitting decisions;
and
• the third marks a general shift away from judge-
led dispute resolution.
The proposals provide various ways to increase
ministerial powers to influence the content of local
plans. Regulation-making powers of wide scope and a
National Planning Template that could impose specific
content-requirements on local authority plans would be
introduced.1 Of particular note however are “stream-
lined planning” processes that would empower the
Minister to make decisions about certain plan changes
and have the final say in relation to the objectives,
policies and rules in those planning documents.2 This
streamlined process could be triggered to “implement a
national direction” or “meet a significant community
need” among other things.3
Under these “streamlined” processes, ministerial deci-
sions could be made on the papers (considering a
summary of public submissions and a cost benefit
analysis prepared by the local authority among other
things).4 Both the NZ Law Society and the Parliamen-
tary Commissioner for the Environment have submitted
that the proposed changes would override local commu-
nities’ autonomy in determining how best to manage
their environments.
In relation to reduced public participation, the amend-
ments would empower the Minister to prescribe which
parties are eligible to be notified of resource consent
applications,5 preclude public notification of certain
activities subject to resource consent,6 and limit the right
to appeal to the NZ Environment Court (NZEnvC) in
relation to various activities such as residential develop-
ment on a single allotment.7 Two new mechanisms for
creating local authority plans also constrain full public
participation (which hitherto has been the norm).8 The
explanatory note to the Bill acknowledges that all of
these measures serve to reduce public participation and
in turn, act to limit the “subject community” of the
NZEnvC.
The existing role of the judiciary would also be
constrained by the amendments. For example, it would
no longer be mandatory that a judge chair boards of
inquiries into nationally significant projects.9 Further,
ministerial decision-making in relation to local plans
(mentioned above) would not be subject to merits appeal
before the NZEnvC or appeals on a point of law before
the High Court.10 At present, the NZEnvC hears disputes
concerning local authority plans and its decision may be
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subject to point of law appeals to the higher courts. But
under the proposals, the only recourse for aggrieved
parties would be judicial review.
It is important to convey just how radical a change
this latter proposal would be. New Zealand has had a
specialist town planning and environmental adjudicative
body for 90 years, and the function of hearing and
determining objections to planning schemes on the
merits, and thus approving final plans, has remained
intact throughout.11 In 1953, the original ministerial-led
town planning board was replaced by an independent
appeal board headed by a legally qualified chair, sup-
ported by professionally qualified members. The change
reflected the desire for the adjudicatory body to be a
neutral arbiter and for public access to justice to increase.
At the time, parliament stated the need for a body
independent from central government (though guided by
it) that could fairly determine the difficult balance
between private rights and the public good12 and that
could travel around the country to be accessible to
communities13 — a body that was “much asked for by
town-planning authorities” as:
… they like to feel that if there is a mistake another mind
can be brought to bear to correct it … they do not want to
feel that they are tyrants.14
The present proposals undermine much of this ratio-
nale.
Wider themes
The Environmental Defence Society has submitted
that many of the proposals will serve to “politicise”
resource management decision-making, while diminish-
ing the ability of the wider public to contribute directly
to environmental management.15
Certainly, reducing public participation runs counter
to international trends in environmental law,16 the gen-
eral legal culture of NZ,17 and conceptions of the RMA
as a “constitutional document”, providing a framework
for public discourse and deliberation.18 But these pro-
posals are not unheralded. Rather, they are part of the
consistent ideology of the national government. More-
over, moves towards de-judicialising and politicising
environmental dispute resolution reflect a tension that is
ever-present, not just in NZ but around the world, that is:
who should make decisions concerning the environ-
ment?
Interestingly, the present proposals and many of the
submissions opposing those proposals are demonstrating
two conceptually different political ideas about environ-
mental decision-making and dispute resolution. The
government’s proposals are based upon the idea that
those entrusted with the tasks of governing possess “a
subjective right to public power”.19 This conception
concerns “representative democracy” and the dominant
idea that “the real guarantee is to be found in the
electoral and representative system”.20 The second con-
ception, favoured by opponents to the proposals and
reflecting core environmental law principles, concerns
“participatory” or “deliberative democracy”. Delibera-
tive democracy suggests that “democracy revolves around
the transformation rather than simply the aggregation of
preferences” and necessitates:
… collective decision-making by all who will be affected
by the decision or their representatives: this is the demo-
cratic part … and includes decision-making by means of
argument offered by and to participants who are committed
to the values of rationality and impartiality: this is the
deliberative part.21
Deliberative democracy has become one of the “major
positions in democratic theory”22 and accords with an
idea of government that is “under the obligation to
employ [its] power to organize public service”,23 creat-
ing institutional conditions that best facilitate participa-
tory democracy.
Importantly, these divergent political ideologies are
reflected in the law. Principles of environmental law
suggest the need for “broad, inclusive and democratic
decision-making processes” as pre-conditions for sub-
stantive forms of environmental justice such as distribu-
tive justice and justice as recognition.24 Better environmental
decision-making is said to flow from increased partici-
pation because:
• it results in the receipt of fuller information
(including potential effects);
• enables decision-makers to better determine the
“public interest”, particularly in relation to dis-
crete, localised, or novel issues; and
• legitimises decisions and reduces possible future
challenges.
As evidenced by Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development and Agenda 21,25
such reasoning points towards “participatory” and “delib-
erative democracy”. These principles are well-known
and not addressed further in this article, but common law
conceptions of natural justice — the procedural stan-
dards that a reviewing court would hold a decision-
maker to — also have considerable implications for
access to environmental justice and should be consid-
ered by those debating the NZ amendments. However,
these common law foundations tend to reinforce con-
ceptions of “representative democracy”, so pulling in the
opposite direction to environmental law principles.
Natural justice implications
While the ability for the public to participate directly
in environmental dispute resolution will vary depending
upon the relevant legislative regime and specific national
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legal culture, common law principles of “natural justice”
also seek to establish fair procedures for parties’ roles in
dispute resolution. But the specific requirements for
natural justice are flexible and context-specific and will
depend on the public power in question, the effect of the
exercise of its use and the nature of the decision-making
body.26 As the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) stressed
in the Attorney-General of Canada v Inuit Tapirisat of
Canada27 case, the very nature of the decision-making
body must be taken into account in determining what
procedures would be considered fair and appropriate.28
Rigorous standards of natural justice are expected
from courts and judicial bodies compared to other forms
of decision-making processes.29 Common law doctrine
establishes that there is a right to be heard in judicial
proceedings,30 and a right to challenge facts that are in
dispute, including expert or technical evidence.31 Mak-
ing submissions requires parties to proffer arguments for
their stance based on the facts and aligned with the legal
tests, and the presumption is for judicial reasons to be
given.32 In the NZ context, the NZEnvC has the statu-
tory power to establish its own procedures,33 but the fact
that it is a court of record and is judge-led influences the
approach taken. As Principal Judge Laurie Newhook
reports, although the NZEnvC operates at times “with a
little less formality … for [example], rules about hearsay
[may be relaxed]”, in general it follows traditional civil
court processes but without restrictive locus standi
rules.34
The same standards of natural justice do not neces-
sarily apply to alternate fora.35 In relation to ministerial
decision-making, reviewing courts are slow “to treat the
Executive Council or Cabinet as under any duty to
follow a procedure at all analogous to judicial proce-
dure”.36 Absent any statutory requirements to the con-
trary, the SCC held that there was no need for the
Executive Council to hold any kind of a hearing or even
to acknowledge the receipt of a petition,37 and executive
decision-makers are not required to give reasons.38 The
rationale is that administrative decision-making should
not be shackled with legal “formalism” taken from
adjudication39 — ministers and administrative bodies
have developed different approaches to resolving dis-
putes to those developed by the courts:
Cabinet is not a fact-finding body in the ordinary sense. It
is not accustomed to conducting hearings or receiving
representations directly from public interest groups or
private individuals … [thus] it is inherently improbable that
in delegating the power of decision … the [legislature]
contemplated the injection of the requirements of natural
justice … into the decision-making process.40
As stated above, the nature of the claim will influence
conceptions of procedural fairness. If individual rights
are impacted by decision-making, higher standards of
natural justice are expected compared to decision that
can be categorised as “policy decisions”,41 and resource
management planning would fall into the latter “policy”
category. Even if rights are impacted, there is no
common law requirement for an oral hearing before the
Minister. At its highest, the test is that the impacted
individual should be able to see any evidence placed
before the Minister that adversely impacts upon their
rights and be able to respond — the Minister should not
make a decision in ignorance.42 In practice, however,
this doctrine will be of little use to those wishing to
challenge the Minister’s decision on local plans. There
are no constitutionally enshrined rights to environmental
protection in NZ — those wishing to challenge minis-
terial decisions that impact upon the conservation of
nature, arguing for a more comprehensive role in decision-
making, will struggle to do so through a rights-based
route.43 There is the possibility that adversely impacted
property rights would found a basis for claiming greater
standards of natural justice,44 but in a “policy-based”
scenario, a reviewing court may require evidence of
particular and individualised damage over that suffered
by the general public.45
The quality and type of “evidence” that suffices for
ministerial decision-making is also entirely different to
court-based adjudication.46Absent clear statutory require-
ments, ministers will not be expected to base decisions
on the “best available information”,47 and even with
such a statutory mandate, the NZ courts have been
unwilling to impose a high test — rather the Minister
retains discretion as to what would be reasonable infor-
mation to obtain in the circumstances.48 Further, minis-
ters may rely upon in-house experts. Ministry employees
may advise the Minister and there would be no common
law requirement to disclose the advice given because
knowledge of ministerial officials is deemed in law to be
the Minister’s knowledge49 and “decision makers bear
no responsibility to disclose matters that are particular to
the decision-maker”.50 In-house advice may not be
objective51 and may merge factual information, opinion
and judgment of the issues,52 but there would be little
scope for challenge. Moreover, confidentiality may apply
to any communication between the Minister and exter-
nal advisers.53 Legislation in NZ prioritises the need for
the free flow of advice between ministers and civil
servants, over the desirability of that communication
being made publicly available. The Official Information
Act 1982 (NZ) protects these communications as privi-
leged — one of the few exceptions to the general
purpose to make all official information freely avail-
able54 (although this protection can be overturned by
persuasive public interest arguments to the contrary).55
Ministers may be under a statutory requirement to
“consult” affected persons and a duty under the Treaty of
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Waitangi to consult with Maori iwi that are impacted.
However, consultation does not equate to negotiation
and does not require the consulting body to adopt the
views of the other. Rather, the highest formulation of the
test means that the consulting party “must keep its mind
open and be ready to change … while quite entitled to
have a working plan already in mind”.56 Pre-
determination is to be expected with ministerial decision-
making,57 again allowing political ideology to dominate,
so providing a sharp contrast to judge-led adjudication.
Deliberative democracy and adjudication
The political scientist Jon Elster has drawn analogies
between court-based adjudication and “deliberative democ-
racy”. He argues that the forum or setting for delibera-
tive democracy, “as a set of institutional conditions that
promotes impartiality”, is important,58 and that delibera-
tive democracy (ie, the procedure of debating one
another before an audience) is analogous to “adversarial
proceedings in the courtroom … the interchanges can
serve to weed out falsehoods and inconsistencies and
thus enable the [decision-maker] to make a good deci-
sion”.59
Deliberate democracy is said to foster political engage-
ment and to provide “a basis for self-respect that
encourage the development of a sense of political
competence, and that contribute to the formation of a
sense of justice”.60 Further, the public are said to “prefer
institutions in which the connections between delibera-
tion and outcomes are evident to ones in which the
connections are less clear”.61
Judicial views mirror political science thinking about
deliberative democracy. Megarry J described “the feel-
ings of resentment” that will be aroused if a party to
legal proceedings is placed in a position where it is
impossible for him to influence the result,62 whereas the
UK Supreme Court referred to participation in decision-
making as fostering human dignity and the rule of law.63
In the judgment of the court, procedural requirements
that decision-makers should listen to persons who have
something relevant to say “promote congruence between
the actions of decision-makers and the law which should
govern their actions”.64 The rule of law values identified
by the UK Supreme Court — promoting participation
and thereby fostering responsive decision-making and
respecting human dignity — are normative in environ-
mental justice65 and promoting greater participatory
democracy in environmental management has been a
dominant theme in international treaty-making, case
law, and the writing of jurists over the last three
decades.66
Conclusion
Taken in their totality, the present NZ proposals
appear to be a contradiction to well-established environ-
mental law principles — principles that promote “par-
ticipatory” or “deliberative democracy” in environmental
management. Importantly, the greater use of ministerial
decision-making under the Resource LegislationAmend-
ment Bill will limit public participation. While ministe-
rial decision-making may be subject to judicial review,
wider legal doctrine serves to reinforce conceptions of
“representative democracy” in that scenario so creating
a direct tension with environmental law principles. In
conclusion, the importance of the law — and this legal
tension in particular — should be expressly acknowl-
edged and addressed in political debates concerning the
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